



I begin where Chief Justice Burger ended: when judged by normal
personal and professional criteria, Robert Bork is among the best
qualified candidates for the Supreme Court of this or any other era.1
Few nominees in our history compare with him in the range of their
professional accomplishments - as public servant, private practi-
tioner, appellate judge, legal scholar. Few compare in the seriousness
of their lifelong engagement with the fundamental questions of con-
stitutional law. Of course, Bork's answers to these questions are
controversial. But who can be surprised by that? Even those, like
myself, who disagree with Bork both can and should admire the way
he has woven theory and practice, reason and passion, into a pattern
that expresses so eloquently our deepest hopes for a life in the law.
The Republic needs more people like Robert Bork. It is a tragedy
that the Republic should repay him for his decades of service by
publicly humiliating him.
Indeed, a first instinct is to search for some quick fix that will
avoid such painful episodes in the future. The most obvious scapegoat
is the Senate: if it had only limited itself to Bork's professional and
personal qualifications, it would never have committed such a blunder.
Or, if Senators insisted on moving to the merits of Bork's views, at
least they should have preserved the proceeding's deliberative char-
acter, and refrained from rushing to the nearest T.V. camera to an-
nounce their judgment to their constituents before hearing the final
debate.
Yet the Senate is hardly the only scapegoat. President Reagan
provides an inviting target: why didn't he listen to the Senators, from
both parties, who warned him to nominate a less controversial can-
didate?
As rival exercises in fault-finding proliferate, it is easy to forget
how much both President-bashers and Senate-bashers have in com-
mon. Both suppose that Bork's fate could have been avoided if only
the President or the Senate (or both) hadn't blundered in some readily
* Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. This is a revised version
of the Leary Lecture, presented at the University of Utah School of Law on November 12,
1987. I am very grateful to my friends at Yale, Utah, and elsewhere for their comments.
I See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 1987: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, iooth Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 701 (1987) (testimony of Warren E. Burger, former Chief Justice of the United
States).
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identifiable way. In doing so, both sides blind themselves to the tragic
aspect of the Bork affair: it is as if Oedipus' problem could have been
avoided if he and his father had only stopped-looked-and-listened
before encountering one another at their fateful crossroad.
As in classic tragedy, Bork's undoing was the product of his great-
est virtues. When his moment came to walk the center of the consti-
tutional stage, these virtues could no longer be interpreted simply as
testimony to his distinguished service. Instead, the nation's constitu-
tional history endowed them with a dramatically different meaning:
Bork's superqualification came to symbolize Ronald Reagan's aspira-
tion to rival Franklin Roosevelt's success in revolutionizing constitu-
tional law by means of transformative appointments to the Supreme
Court. My first task is to examine this symbolic process, showing
how historical precedents from the Roosevelt era impressed a tragic
meaning on Bork's virtues which he himself was powerless to deflect.
I next consider the recurring presidential effort to make transformative
appointments as a distinctive constitutional phenomenon worthy of
study in its own right. What institutional ingredients are necessary
before constitutional doctrine can be revolutionized by transformative
appointments? How do these compare with the institutional processes
for constitutional revision specified by the Founders in article V? By
juxtaposing the classic method of constitutional amendment with the
modern practice of transformative appointment, I hope to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of these alternative modes of constitutional
transformation. I conclude with a proposal for reform of our higher
lawmaking system that tries to build on the strengths of both the
classic model and the modern practice, while sharing the faults of
neither.
II. THE GHOSTS OF PRESIDENTS PAST
To gain perspective on the past, begin with a thought-experiment
about a might-have-been. Suppose that the Senate vote on Robert
Bork has gone the other way, and that Justice Bork now proceeds to
confirm his opponents' worst fears. Not only does he wield his "swing
vote" with devastating effect on precedents from the Warren and
Burger eras, but he provides the new conservative majority with an
intellectual dynamism that it has not known previously. Within the
space of a few years, much of the judicial work of a full generation
- involving the constitutional status of privacy, equality, reappor-
tionment - is consigned to the garbage heap of discarded precedent.
In retrospect, it becomes clear that the Bork appointment did in fact
herald the dawn of a new day in the constitutional life of the nation.
Of course, whether Bork's appointment would have had any such
transformative consequence is a matter for unending speculation. In
calling Bork's appointment potentially transformative, my aim is not
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to predict the future but to remind us that similar events have hap-
pened in the past. This will allow us to put some historical perspective
on the Bork proceeding, and thereby glimpse its tragic aspect.
My Bork scenario recalls, of course, Franklin Roosevelt's success
in transforming the main lines of constitutional law in the 1930's.
Like Ronald Reagan, Franklin Roosevelt won reelection on a political
program that repudiated a complex body of constitutional principle
developed by a generation and more of Supreme Court justices. Like
Reagan, Roosevelt despaired of changing the Constitution by mobiliz-
ing the people to enact formal amendments in the way described by
article V. Instead, he sought to change the path of constitutional law
by making transformative judicial appointments.
Unlike Reagan, Roosevelt succeeded - but not before his effort
encountered furious resistance in the Senate. Thus, when Roosevelt
proposed that Congress authorize six new appointments to the Court,
the Senate rejected his court-packing proposal. As traditionalist Jus-
tices retired, however, the Senate gave enthusiastic support to a series
of transformative appointments, which had precisely the consequences
that Roosevelt's opponents feared - and Reagan's opponents fear
today. Within a few short years, the New Deal majority had deci-
sively repudiated the rights-oriented jurisprudence so elaborately de-
veloped by its Republican predecessors. 2
The delegitimizing technique used by the New Deal Court in this
levelling operation fits neatly into our unfolding Bork scenario. Just
as Justice Bork might have appealed to the "intent of the Framers"
to undercut the Warren Court, the New Dealers appealed to the
Framers to undercut the Lochner Court. Of course, Bork's "original-
ism" would have been used to discredit a different set of individual
rights - based on privacy and equality rather than on property and
contract. Nonetheless, the basic legal move would have been the
same.
Call it the myth of rediscovery: a new wave of presidential ap-
pointments repudiates the Court's immediate past by appealing to the
"intent of the Framers" of more distant times, and then reinterprets
this intent in ways that give the President's party new authority to
enact its program. Thus, after its transformative act of reinterpreta-
tion, the New Deal Court upheld congressional legislation modifying
received notions of property and contract despite contrary Old Court
precedent. Similarly, under Bork's leadership, the Reagan Court
might have solemnly declared that its predecessors had profoundly
distorted the "intent of the Framers" in giving constitutional meaning
to values such as privacy, equality, and fairness in the electoral pro-
cess.
2 The relationship to the 193o's will be pursued at greater depth below, at pp. 1170-77.
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Of course, this radical rejection of the Warren and Burger Courts
in the name of the Framers would have hardly marked the end of
constitutional debate. Though Black and Frankfurter both agreed
that the Lochner Court had illegitimately distorted the Framers' in-
tentions, they nonetheless disagreed about the best way to avoid a
repetition of the Old Court's mistakes. Undoubtedly, Bork too would
have met his Frankfurter. Despite their ongoing differences, however,
neither the "originalist" Bork nor the "evolutionist" anti-Bork would
have been tempted to repeat the paradigmatic mistakes of the era of
the Warren and Burger Courts. In our hypothetical world of post-
Bork jurisprudence, Roe v. Wade3 and Reynolds v. Sims4 would have
functioned in the same way that Lochner v. New York5 and Hammer
v. Dagenhart6 function in our existing universe of constitutional ar-
gument: as powerful negative precedents cautioning us never again to
commit the judicial blunders of a discredited past.
II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR TRAGEDY
With the aid of the Roosevelt precedent, we may glimpse the tragic
aspect of the Bork affair. To put the point in a single line, it was
precisely because Bork was superqualified by normal appointment
criteria that he served as such a compelling symbol of the Reagan
effort to catalyze a judicial transformation of Rooseveltian magnitude.
After all, the normal Supreme Court nominee simply has not
generated the kind of track record that would allow his opponents to
gain credibility for their fears that the President's nominee might be
a transformative appointment. Speaking generally, presidential nom-
inations come in two varieties. First, there are the "solid profession-
als" qualified for appointment by reason of their distinguished service
as president of the American Bar Association, as assistant attorney
general, or as appellate judge. Typically, these nominees have not
had the time, energy, or inclination to publish essays reflecting upon
the fundamental questions of constitutional law in the manner of
Robert Bork. Thus, even if the nominees harbor transformative am-
bitions, it is hard for opponents to make this charge plausible in
public debate. Moreover, as an empirical matter, it is quite unlikely
that solid professionals do in fact harbor transformative ambitions.
Distinguished lawyers are far more likely to be masters of interstitial
accommodation than propounders of revolutionary constitutional
theses.
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 377 U.S. 533 (1964)-
1 I98 U.S. 45 (1905).
6 247 U.S. 251 (I918).
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A second type may, in contrast, be more open to such a leadership
role. These are the nominees who have spent most of their adult lives
in politics. Unlike solid professionals, successful politicians are ac-
customed to dealing in sweeping (if vague) pronunciamentos. Though
they have legal training, they probably have not invested much of
their spiritual capital in mastering the conceptual order of the existing
legal universe. Thus, this type may be more amenable to the sugges-
tion that the last generation of judges has somehow lost touch with
the Framers and that a sharp break with established doctrine is
imperative.
Even here, however, the successful politician who looks upon the
Supreme Court with serious transformative intent is rare. Rarer still
is the politician who combines this intent with the requisite legal
ability to spearhead a transformative movement in constitutional law.
While casting a "swing vote" is important, intellectual leadership is
no less so: Earl Warren needed William Brennan. It is unusual, to
say the least, when the nomination of a successful politician to the
Court can be viewed as a signal of a presidential design to transform
the reigning principles of constitutional law.
Thus, it is quite wrong to discount the Senate's resistance to Bork
as "merely" a matter of partisan politics. While the Democrats who
controlled the Senate would have looked skeptically upon any pro-
posed replacement for Lewis Powell's swing vote, they were no less
aware of the dangers of appearing "stubbornly obstructionist" as the
nation began to think about the next presidential election. It was
precisely Robert Bork's multifaceted excellence that allowed the Dem-
ocrats to endow their opposition with a dramatically different political
meaning. In contrast to the normal nominee, here was a man whose
public record suggested that he might possess both the transformative
vision and legal ability needed to spearhead a radical judicial break
with the past. If the Senate was ever to raise questions about the
constitutional direction in which the President proposed to lead the
nation, surely it was this nomination that made such questioning
appropriate?
It was Bork's capacity to symbolize the prospect of a Rooseveltian
transformation that made the Senate hearings such an extraordinary
event. Normally, there is no need for the nominee to define his
transformative intentions through an intense dialogue with concerned
Senators, for there is nothing in the nominee's past that would give
substance to such a sustained dialogue. Instead, most nominees can
blandly assure the Senate that they have yet to grapple with the large
questions of constitutional law that await them on the bench, and
promise that they will judge each case on its merits as the Lord allows
them to grasp those merits. Opponents to a nomination are then
obliged to search for evidence of personal misconduct or professional
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inadequacy if they hope to defeat the President's nominee. In contrast,
by virtue of Bork's lifelong public engagement with the fundamental
questions of constitutional law, the transformative possibilities in-
volved in the President's nomination were a matter of public record
before Robert Bork took the stand to testify on his own behalf. 7 Thus
the scene had already been set for tragedy: if the Senate and the
country decided that President Reagan should not be granted Roose-
velt-like authority, they could express this judgment only by rejecting
a nominee who, by normal criteria, was superbly qualified for the
office.
I do not propose here to trace the way this theme was elaborated
in the course of the debate in Washington and around the country.
My point is that it was the very distinction of Bork's past that invited
the Senate to ask itself a distinctive question: should President Rea-
gan, like President Roosevelt, be granted the constitutional authority
to make transformative appointments?
Not that this question wasn't brewing in some of Reagan's earlier
Supreme Court nominations. In retrospect, it is possible to see an
escalation in the President's transformative ambitions. In nominating
Sandra Day O'Connor, the President began with a nomination at the
opposite pole from his Bork proposal. While O'Connor was a solid
professional who held vaguely conservative views, these facts did not
account for the President's decision to single her out. Instead, he was
using her nomination as a reassuring symbol to a potentially important
voting bloc.8 In this, if nothing else, Sandra O'Connor resembles
William Brennan, another solid professional who does not owe his
place on the Court to his distinctive substantive views, but to Presi-
dent Eisenhower's desire to symbolize his sympathy with Democratic
Catholics from Northern industrial states before the 1956 election. 9
7 Thus, while the Judiciary Committee's majority report devotes six pages to a critique of
Bork's conduct during the Watergate affair, see SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH
CONG., IST SEss., NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BORK TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, ExEc. REP. 7, 65-71 (1987), the rest of the 99-page document
does not focus on Bork's personal or professional attributes but on his substantive views and
concludes that "[tihe positions adopted by Judge Bork at critical moments of decision bespeak
a perilous inclination for one who would guide our nation's future." Id. at 98.
8 During his I98o presidential campaign, candidate Reagan had promised that "[o]ne of the
first Supreme Court vacancies in my administration will be filled by the most qualified woman
I can find ... ." H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 330 (1985). Professor Abraham
concludes that "[i]n descending order of importance, balancing representation, political/ideolog-
ical compatibility, and objective merit were the three main motivations in President Reagan's
selection of O'Connor." Id. at 333.
9 Professor Abraham usefully spells out the political symbolism involved in Eisenhower's
nomination of Brennan one month before the i956 election, as well as the President's subsequent
disappointment with Brennan's voting record on the Court. See id. at 262-63. But why should
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With the nominations of Rehnquist and Scalia after the President's
reelection, appointments began to take a more transformative turn.
Nonetheless, conditions were not yet ripe for a national debate on the
President's constitutional pretensions. Not only were the Republicans
still in control of the Senate, but neither Rehnquist nor Scalia raised
the prospect of a Rooseveltian transformation with Bork-like clarity.
While Rehnquist had established his transformative inclinations dur-
ing his lengthy service as Associate Justice, he had also demonstrated
that, without further reinforcements, he could not lead the Court to
make a sharp and sustained break with the past. Similarly, Antonin
Scalia's public views on the Constitution were less distinct than Bork's
and less distinctively transformative in their implications. Even if the
Judiciary Committee had then been controlled by Democrats, could
they have successfully established in the public mind that Scalia prom-
ised anything more than conservative variations on the major doctrinal
themes established by the Warren and Burger Courts?
We will never know. What we can say is that Bork's remarkable
virtues crystallized the question of transformative appointments. Here
was a man who transparently did not owe his nomination to his sex,
race, religion, national origin, or regional roots. He owed it to the
power of his mind, the vigor of his ideas, and his demonstrated
capacity to act on his convictions in moments of crisis. If there was
anything wrong with his nomination, it was precisely that Ronald
Reagan had failed to earn the Rooseveltian authority to insist that the
Senate endorse a radical break with the constitutional achievements
of the last generation.
IV. THE MODEL OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
My aim thus far has been to present the Bork affair as a tragedy
rather than a farce. The affair looks farcical only if one supposes
that it centrally involved the application of normal principles of ju-
dicial qualification. It takes on a very different meaning when viewed
as part of a difficult process by which our constitutional system is
gradually coming to terms with the transformational precedents be-
queathed to us by the Roosevelt era. 10 The New Deal established
Eisenhower have been disappointed by Brennan's judicial performance when constitutional
philosophy played such a small role in his initial decision?
10 Roosevelt's success in making transformative appointments itself built upon nineteenth-
century practice, most notably the efforts of the Jackson and Grant Administrations to challenge
then-existing constitutional principles. See C. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, 5 THE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
30 (1974) (discussing the connection between support for Chief Justice Taney's appointment and
the desire for changes in Court policies); C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-
88, pt. i, 6 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 677 (1971) (discussing the relation of the appointments of Justices Strong
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that the President may, under certain conditions, gain senatorial au-
thorization to lead a radical break with reigning constitutional prin-
ciples by means of transformative appointments. The Reagan years
are establishing, however, that these conditions are very stringent
ones, and that the President normally can expect a skeptical response
when he embarks on a course of judicial appointments that arguably
has a transformative aspect. Such a fundamental constitutional prec-
edent has not been established without bitter debate and personal
tragedy. Now that the shouting is over, it is not too soon to try to
put the latest precedent into larger legal perspective: what does the
Bork affair teach us about the process through which modern Amer-
icans go about transforming their constitutional law?
A. The Classical System Compared
Begin by contrasting both the Roosevelt and Reagan precedents
with the classical system of constitutional amendment set out in the
text of article V. Here the Founders expressly contemplated the pos-
sibility that future generations of Americans may authorize new po-
litical movements to make fundamental changes in preexisting consi-
tutional principle. How does the method of transformative
appointment differ from the methods for constitutional transformation
set out in article V? In two basic ways: one involves the nature of
the institutions whose assent must be gained before a political move-
ment can transform its constitutional vision into constitutional law;
the second involves the legal form in which the constitutional change
is codified.
i. The Changing Institutional Matrix. - Consider first the dis-
tinctive institutional matrix through which the Democrats in the 1930's
and the Republicans in the i98o's sought to make new constitutional
law. Both of these exercises in transformative appointment challenged
three basic institutional premises of article V.
The first involves the Article's commitment to dual federalism.
Before a new political movement can break with the constitutional
past by enacting an article V amendment, it must gain the assent of
both national and state institutions. In the case of transformative
appointments, however, only the consent of national institutions is
necessary. The modern practice is, then, far more nationalistic than
its classical predecessor. Although the Founders expected constitu-
tional proposals for constitutional re-vision to be tested in a dialogue
and Bradley to the decision of the Legal Tender Cases). Although both of these presidential
efforts succeeded in changing the course of constitutional doctrine significantly, neither did so
in the massive way accomplished by Roosevelt in the 1930's. Similarly, the earlier efforts by
Thomas Jefferson to undermine the Marshall Court through transformative appointments were
even less successful.
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between the nation and the states, modern practice tests proposed
transformative appointments in a dialogue between different branches
of the national government.
The new prominence of the national separation of powers implies
a second major institutional change. In writing article V, the Framers
supposed that only one kind of institution would be involved in the
process of constitutional change: only popular assemblies, acting on
both national and state levels, were to decide whether the People
supported a decisive break with the constitutional past. In contrast,
the twentieth century has seen other institutions play a decisive role.
Most notably, it is the Presidency in the 193o's and the i98o's that
claims a mandate from the People in support of constitutional revision.
The fate of this presidential initiative is then debated and determined
first by the Senate's assessment of transformative appointments and
ultimately by the Court. To mark this second contrast, I shall say
that the classical system of constitutional transformation is assembly-
led, while twentieth century practice has often been presidentially-
led. 11
The rise of the Presidency prepares the way, in turn, for a third
institutional break with article V. This involves the role of presiden-
tial elections in the process by which Roosevelt and Reagan sought to
gain constitutional authority for their transformative appointments.
Defenders of both Presidents claimed that their successful reelection
gave them a popular "mandate" to transform preexisting constitutional
principle. As far as article V is concerned, however, presidential
elections are non-events. The only elections it deems relevant for
ascertaining the People's will are those involving the selection of rep-
resentatives to constitutional conventions or legislatures deliberating
on amendments in Washington and the state capitals. While the
Article's narrow focus blinds us to the importance modern Americans
11 In addition to these exercises in presidential leadership, is it right to say that the twentieth
century has also seen the rise of Court-led constitutional transformations? In this scenario, the
Supreme Court does not break with established constitutional doctrine unless a lengthy process
occurs, through which the President gains the support of the Senate and the voters for a series
of transformative appointments. Rather than following the political branches, the Court claims
the constitutional authority to embrace new principles that have no legitimate interpretive
warrant in the relevant constitutional sources. This effort at constitutional leadership then'
provokes a complex response in the political branches and the nation more generally, which
leads finally to the acceptance, rejection, or modification of the judicial initiative.
Although I shall discuss this hypothesis at length in the larger project, mentioned below in
note 21, of which this Comment is a part, I cannot do it justice here. For starters, it requires
us to rethink the judicial work products of both the Lochner and Warren eras and consider
whether they can be defended as bona fide interpretive efforts or whether they are best viewed
as exercises in judicial leadership of the kind hypothesized here. I have found, alas, that such
questions require book-length treatment before they can be meaningfully addressed. But see
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1070-72
(1984); see also infra note 20.
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attach to presidential elections as a forum in which we debate our
constitutional future, it would be a mistake to go to the opposite
extreme and suppose that every presidential election has catalyzed an
effort by the victor to use the appointment power to make a decisive
break with the constitutional achievements of the past generation.
Instead, transformative nominations have been seriously considered
only after a President has won decisive reelection on the basis of a
political program advocating fundamental change in reigning consti-
tutional principle.
2. From Institutional Substance to Legal Form. - These changes
in the institutional matrix of higher lawmaking generate a second,
and very different, kind of challenge to classical premises. This con-
cerns the legal form through which a movement for constitutional
change ultimately expresses its higher lawmaking victory. In the clas-
sical system of assembly-led transformation, the People's demand for
a fundamental change in constitutional principles is expressed in a
text characteristic of legislative decision: a formal amendment to the
preexisting constitution. In the presidentially-led system of transfor-
mative appointments, final victory is marked by a decisive set of
transformative judicial opinions that self-consciously repudiate preex-
isting doctrinal premises and announce new principles that redefine
the American people's constitutional identity.
B. The Limits of Presidential Leadership
So much for the similarities between the efforts by Roosevelt Dem-
ocrats and Reagan Republicans to lead American institutions to make
a sharp break with their constitutional past. What are the differences?
Before Franklin Roosevelt gained the Senate's advice and consent
to transformative appointments, he did more than simply win reelec-
tion. Most obviously, he led the Democratic Party to a remarkable
series of electoral victories in Congress. Looking narrowly at the
Senate, the differences between the Roosevelt and Reagan years does
not show up so dramatically on the day each President first took
possession of the White House: in both 1932 and 198o, the President's
party took control of the Senate for the first time in many years
(fourteen years in the case of the Democrats, twenty-six in the case
of the Republicans). The key difference is that Roosevelt succeeded,
and Reagan failed, to build on this initial success. During Reagan's
first six years, Republican support in the Senate remained in the low
5o's, and finally sank to minority status in 1986, despite the President's
warning about the fate of future Supreme Court nominees. In con-
trast, the New Deal Democrats kept building their representation to
unprecedented heights during the next two elections - so that, after
their landslide victory of 1936, there were no fewer than seventy-six
Democrats in the Senate. By the time President Roosevelt gained his
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first chance to name a Supreme Court Justice in 1937, only sixteen
Republicans remained to represent the views of a party that had
dominated American political life from the Civil War to the Great
Depression. 12
But numbers tell only a part of the story. Even more important
is what the Democrats did with their increasingly overwhelming ma-
jorities in the political branches. In sharp contrast with the Reagan
years, the 1930's saw the President's promise of a "New Deal" take
solid form in a series of pathbreaking statutory initiatives that gave
the American people some practical experience with the new ideals
for national government proclaimed in Washington, D.C. At the same
time, the Supreme Court was contributing to the American people's
political education by presenting a rich constitutional critique reveal-
ing the extent to which the New Deal's innovations could be seen as
departing from our nation's traditional political principles.
Thus, by the time Roosevelt had an opportunity to transform the
Court in his second term with the appointments of Justices Black,
Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy,'13 the American people had
12 The following table compares majority and minority party representation in the Senate at
comparable stages in the Roosevelt and Reagan Presidencies:
PRINCIPAL
PRESIDENT'S PARTY PoITIPAROPPOSITION PARTY
ELECTION YEAR Roosevelt Reagan Roosevelt Reagan
Senatorial election year preceding first 47 41 48 58
presidential victory (1930, 1978)
First presidential victory (1932, 198o) 6o 53 35 46
Midterm election (i934, 1982) 69 54 25 46
Second presidential victory (1936, 1984) 76 53 16 47
Midterm election (1938, i986) 69 46 23 54
This data was compiled from CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS
xi6 (1985) and WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1987-88, at xv (1987). The difference
between the Roosevelt and Reagan efforts at presidential leadership is even more striking in the
House of Representatives, where the Republican contingent sank from 214 on the eve of
Roosevelt's election to 89 in the aftermath of his reelection in 1936, while the Republicans never
came close to gaining control of the House during the Reagan years, doing no better than the
192 seats at the time of Reagan's first presidential victory. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE
TO U.S. ELECTIONS, supra, at ix16.
For investigations of Reagan's failure to match Roosevelt's success in gaining control over
Congress, compare J. CHUBB & P. PETERSON, Realignment and Institutionalization, in THE
NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 17-20 (1985), which emphasizes the modern represen-
tative's enhanced capacity to insulate himself from presidential coattails, with Ferejohn &
Fiorina, Incumbency and Realignment, in J. CHUBB & P. PETERSON, cited above, at 91, lis,
which suggests that "a critical minority of voters" wants different parties to control different
branches of government "not because it reflects their notion of the ideal situation, but because
they have decided it is the best they can hope for given the present configuration of the two
parties."
13 See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 390.
[Vol. ioi:xI6 41174
HeinOnline -- 101 Harv. L. Rev.  1174 1987-1988
TRANSFORMATIVE APPOINTMENTS
already participated in a five-year process of political education in
which they had been given an opportunity to gain practical experience
with, and hear powerful critiques of, the new kind of national gov-
ernment being built in their name in Washington, D.C.
Not that all Americans enthusiastically embraced the intervention-
ist welfare state elaborated by the New Deal. In addition to the tiny
band of sixteen Republican senators and eighty-nine Republican rep-
resentatives who remained on Capitol Hill after the landslide of
193614, almost seventeen million Americans did prefer Alf Landon to
Franklin Roosevelt in the presidential elections.' 5 Nonetheless, even
they could not deny that a decisive majority of Americans had voted
for the New Deal with their eyes open to the practical and constitu-
tional implications of their collective decision. If ever there was a
time that the People could be said to have endorsed a sharp break
with their constitutional past, it was when Roosevelt and the Senate
self-consciously began to make transformative Supreme Court appoint-
ments.
How different was the scene in 1987. After seven years in the
White House, the President had failed to convince Congress to support
his constitutional ideals. Thus, his advocacy of a constitutional
amendment requiring balanced budgets was mocked by his Adminis-
tration's unprecedented budget deficits; his appeals for a "right to life"
amendment were belied by his own refusal to make a serious effort
to persuade Congress to enact even "right to life" statutes that would
induce the Supreme Court to reconsider Roe v. Wade; and so forth.
This background made Reagan's nomination of Robert Bork seem a
desperate effort by a lame-duck President to impose a constitutional
program that had otherwise failed to gain the support of Congress,
rather than the symbolic culmination of a period of emphatic popular
approval for the statutory initiatives of his administration. Little
wonder that the Senate took Bork's superqualifications more as a
challenge than as a reassurance, and insisted upon its authority to
deliberate whether Bork's constitutional philosophy deserved the sup-
port of We the People of the United States.
Indeed, despite the vastly different conditions prevailing in the
1930's, it is important to recall that the Senate also refused to give
President Roosevelt free rein on the matter of transformative appoint-
ments. When Roosevelt sought to gain Congressional approval for a
"court-packing" statute that would have allowed him to propose six
transformative appointments in the aftermath of the landslide of
1936,16 the Senate refused to be swayed by presidential rhetoric far
more powerful than any that President Reagan could muster:
14 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 12, at iii6.
Is This amounted to 36.5% of the total popular vote. See id. at 1120.
16 The President's proposal did not necessarily expand the size of the Supreme Court to 15
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In this fight, as the lawyers themselves say, time is of the essence. In
three elections during the past five years great majorities have ap-
proved what we are trying to do. To me, and I am sure to you, those
majorities mean that the people themselves realize the increasing ur-
gency that we meet their needs now. Every delay creates risks of
intervening events which make more and more difficult an intelligent,
speedy, and democratic solution of our difficulties.' 7
Despite the President's confident interpretation of his mandate
from "the people themselves," the Senate insisted on preserving its
own deliberative authority to determine whether the President's ini-
tiative deserved the American people's assent. Listen, for example,
to the Senate Judiciary Committee recommending the rejection of the
President's court-packing initiative:
Even if every charge brought against the so-called "reactionary" mem-
bers of this Court be true, it is far better that we await orderly but
inevitable change of personnel than that we impatiently overwhelm
them with new members. Exhibiting this restraint, thus demonstrat-
ing our faith in the American system, we shall set an example that
will protect the independent American judiciary from attack as long
as this Government stands. 18
Note the care with which the Committee majority stated its objection
to the President's initiative. It did not reject the deliberate transfor-
mation of constitutional law through the use of the appointment
power. It protested against the President's desire to "impatiently over-
whelm" the Supreme Court rather than engage in an "orderly" process
of senatorial deliberation as death and resignation take their toll.
It is precisely this suggestion that, fifty years later, was taken up
by the Judiciary Committee in 1987. As the 1937 Committee had
members. Instead, court-packing was a part of a more general reorganization of the federal
judiciary. The key provision created a new position if the incumbent judge did not resign upon
reaching the age of 70 years and 6 months. Since there were then six Justices older than this
on the Court, it was up to them whether they would remain on an expanded bench or resign
and keep the Court's size below 15. If all six of the Justices exercised this second option, the
Court would have remained at its traditional size. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., ist Sess. 1-2
(1937).
17 F.D. Roosevelt, Address at the Democratic Victory Dinner (March 4, 1937), reprinted in
1937 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 113, 120 (1941); see
also F.D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary, reprinted in THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra, at 122-33 (featuring similar
rhetoric and a fascinating defense of court-packing as a transformational device superior to
article V amendments). The President made these two speeches during the week before the
March io opening of the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings on court-packing. At the
hearing, Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson elaborated the President's public speeches
in a remarkable formal presentation. See Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings on
S. 1392 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., ist Sess. 38-51 (1937).
18 SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 14.
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hoped, their own struggles over the problem of transformative ap-
pointments did indeed "set an example" which the members of the
1987 Committee managed to emulate. Just as the majority of the
1937 Committee refused to respond to Roosevelt's invocation of a
"mandate from the People" by rubber-stamping his request for six
transformative appointments, so too the 1987 Committee refused to
rubber-stamp the President's nomination of Robert Bork. Instead,
both Committees urged the Senate to make an independent judgment
on the constitutional merits of the potentially transformative proposal
that the President had placed before them. Rather than simply defer
to the President's desires for a sharp break with existing doctrine, the
Senate asserted its own authority to consider whether the President's
transformative initiative deserved the considered support of We the
People of the United States.
C. The Last Word
Such qualitative judgments are always controversial. The impor-
tant point to recognize is that the Senate's 1987 decision by no means
settled the question. The final judgment on the Bork affair will be
rendered in 1988, when our representatives in Washington return to
the electorate to renew and redefine their mandate. Thus, partisans
of Robert Bork's constitutional vision may try to make his rejection
a central issue of the forthcoming election campaign, appealing to the
voters to "send a message to Washington" by defeating those Senators
who were deaf to the People's demand for a repudiation of key prec-
edents of the Burger and Warren Courts. Similarly, the Republicans
may nominate a presidential candidate who makes the Bork nomi-
nation one of the central points of his campaign and promises the
American people that he will continue on the transformative path
marked out by President Reagan.
If the Republicans were to take this course, they might make the
next election into a constitutional referendum; if they won the Presi-
dency and the Senate after such a campaign, the next presidential
effort at a transformative appointment could well meet with a rather
different Senatorial reception. Indeed, in this scenario, the next Pres-
ident might even seek to seal his mandate from the People by renom-
inating Robert Bork to the next vacancy on the Court. "Nobody
seriously believes," he could explain, "that Robert Bork's rejection in
1987 suggested a lack of normal judicial qualifications; and now that
the People have spoken more clearly in favor of the views Bork
expressed at the Senate hearings, is it not appropriate to symbolize
the American people's demand for constitutional change by placing
Bork 'where he belonged in the first place'?"
Of course, it is perfectly possible to envision very different turns
in our constitutional debate. Rather than reinvigorating their political
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crusade, the supporters of Judge Bork's constitutional vision may
reveal, by their own actions, that they cannot presently win a decisive
popular mandate for a radical repudiation of established constitutional
doctrine. In this alternate scenario, conservative activists will ac-
quiesce in the nomination of Republican candidates for the Presidency
and the Senate who refuse to focus their campaigns on the great
constitutional principles ventilated at the Bork hearings, but agonize
instead over marginal changes in the rate of taxation, inflation, and
unemployment. Given this turn in our public dialogue, most Repub-
licans who might win in 1988 would not return to Washington with
a sense that they had received a popular mandate to reconsider the
Senate's judgment on the Bork affair. Instead, they would join their
Democratic colleagues in discouraging the next President from nomi-
nating superqualified conservative critics of the Court who might
provoke bitter reenactments of the Bork hearings. In this alternate
scenario, the personal tragedy of Robert Bork would go down in
history as a marker of a failed constitutional moment, in which a
political movement, after raising a new agenda for constitutional re-
form, fails to generate the kind of deep and broad support necessary
to legitimate a change in the constitutional principles institutionally
defended in the name of We the People.
As it is this second scenario that seems to be unfolding before us,
I should emphasize that even this outcome will not forever end public
controversy over the Senate's 1987 decision. Surely another time will
come when some future President will capture the White House on a
political program that calls into question the constitutional achieve-
ments of the recent past. Especially if she gains reelection, she will
doubtless interpret her repeated political victories as a popular man-
date for a fundamental break with existing legal doctrine, and will
call upon the Senate to consent to some potentially transformative
appointments. At that point, the precedents established in 1987, no
less than those of 1937, will shape the way this presidential demand
will be received, debated, and decided.
When that day comes, there is no reason to suppose that the views
then expressed by the future President's superqualified nominee will
have much resemblance to those of Robert Bork. Perhaps they will
be far better, perhaps they will be far worse. My aim in this essay,
however, has not been to criticize the merits of Bork's doctrinal views,
much less to persuade you of my own. It has been to suggest that
there is more to constitutional law than the doctrinal opinions held
by you or me or Robert Bork. The Constitution is, first and foremost,
a project in democratic self-rule, providing us with institutions and a
language by which we may discriminate between the passing show of
normal politics and the deeper movements in popular opinion which,
after much passionate debate and institutional struggle, ultimately
earn a'democratic place in the constitutional law of a Republic com-
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mitted to the rule of We the People. 19 The challenge has been to
locate the Bork tragedy as a part of this ongoing project in self-
government, and thereby isolate an important way in which twentieth
century Americans have come to differ from their predecessors in the
manner they debate and decide their constitutional future. In deciding
whether to authorize a sharp break with their constitutional past,
today's Americans do not use only the classical system of constitutional
amendment described by the rules of article V. In the aftermath of
the New Deal, they also find it meaningful to participate in a presi-
dentially-led process of debate over transformative appointments, in
which the Senate becomes a crucial forum for determining the legiti-
macy of a sharp break with the constitutional achievements of the
recent past. 20
V. REFORM?
Once we have grasped this fact about ourselves, we have prepared
the way for some final questions. Is the practice of transformative
appointments a good thing? If not, what can be done to improve
matters in the future?
My own answer is that it is a bad thing, but there is no going
back to the good old days when article V provided the only means
by which Americans debated changes in their constitutional destiny.21
19 See Ackerman, supra note ii.
20 A note of caution: it is one thing to claim, as I do here, that Bork's defeat signifies the
President's failure to carry the People with him in his critique of the Warren and Burger Courts;
it is quite another to give the Senate vote a more expansive meaning and claim that it decisively
establishes that a mobilized majority of Americans affirmatively endorse all the constitutional
principles Bork criticized.
A reference to an analogous problem arising under the classic article V process reveals the
non sequitur involved in making this more ambitious claim. Consider the status of gender
equality after the failure of the ERA to gain ratification by three-fourths of the states. Does
the success of ERA's opponents in blocking this initiative imply that most Americans reject the
principles of gender equality? Of course not. All it shows is that a movement for constitutional
revision must surmount a very formidable series of hurdles before it can earn the authority to
revise the Constitution in the name of We the People. So too here: although Reagan's consti-
tutional initiative failed to survive the Senate, those who blocked Bork would have to make a
much more elaborate argument before they could convincingly claim that the People have
affirmatively endorsed the liberal constitutional principles challenged by Reagan's nominee.
What would such an argument look like? Is it plausible? If not, how should the present
Supreme Court look upon cases such as Brown, Reynolds, and Griswold in the aftermath of
Reagan's failed effort at constitutional transformation? While I believe that the general approach
to the Constitution adumbrated here does provide a framework for grappling with these fun-
damental questions, this brief commentary is hardly the place to attempt a convincing response.
21 As I have suggested elsewhere, the "good old days" of article V's hegemonic sway are
older than most constitutionalists recognize. Our nation's decisive break with the institutional
premises of article V did not occur in the I93O's but in the xS6o's. See Ackerman, supra note
ii, at IO65-70. A forthcoming book will explore the relationship between the higher lawmaking
practice of Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats at greater length.
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If we wish to avoid the future abuse of transformative appointments,
we should come to terms with the deeper institutional changes that
have made this practice seem symbolically appropriate to twentieth
century Americans. Whatever their vices, debates over transformative
appointments have two important virtues. As we have seen, such
appointments provide, first, a nationalistic process which allows the
American people to change their fundamental law without going
through the states; and, second, a mechanism that allows the Presi-
dency to play an important role in the process by which the American
people determine their -constitutional destiny. These two features ex-
press two fundamental respects in which the present American un-
derstanding differs from that of the Founders. Since the Civil War,
it has become clear to us that We the People of the United States
exist as a nation independently of the will of the individual states. At
least since the New Deal, 22 it has become clear to us that a principal
way in which we democratically decide our fate as a People is through
the vehicle of presidential elections.
The Founders anticipated neither of these decisive changes. They
feared a plebiscitarian Presidency, 23 and they knew that their fellow
citizens were then unwilling to endorse unequivocally a nationalistic
conception of the Union24 that, a century after the Civil War, almost
all of us take for granted. As a consequence, the Founders could
hardly have designed a system of constitutional amendment that cor-
responds to the modern sense of ourselves as We the People of the
United States, in which the debate generated by presidential elections
plays a central role in the democratic determination of our national
identity. The rise of transformative appointments in twentieth century
constitutional practice is not some random event, unconnected to
deeper changes in the modern American's relationship to the national
government. We find the technique acceptable because it allows us
to express the nationalistic side of our constitutional identity in a way
that is unavailable to us when we follow the federalistic, assembly-led
forms of article V.
And yet I think we can design a far better mechanism for express-
ing these nationalistic changes in our institutional identity than de-
bating transformative appointments. When judged as a method of
democratic political change, this evolving practice has three principal
deficiencies. First, the debate over the constitutional principles in-
volved in a particular transformative appointment is, almost inevita-
22 The roots of this transformation of the Presidency go back to critical decisions made by
Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, 'Johnson, and Wilson. For present purposes, however, it is not
absolutely necessary to look past the second Roosevelt.
23 See J. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT 52-64 (1979)
(discussing the Founders' anxieties about "popular leadership').
24 See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 250, 257 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. x961).
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bly, poorly focused. These vital questions will often be deflected by
the personal style, charisma, frailties of the individual nominee. They
may be obscured by the strategic manipulation of rhetoric by both
the nominee's friends and foes, to the point where it is no longer clear
where the nominee is seeking to lead the Court. Contrast this poten-
tial for confusion with the classical article V system, where the par-
tisans of constitutional change must formulate a formal amendment
before they can expect a serious debate to begin. Although textual
statement of principle hardly eliminates all ambiguity and confusion,
it does provide a focus for democratic discussion that can be entirely
lost in the swirl of bobbing-and-weaving characteristic of a Senate
confirmation hearing.
Second, although the classical system is deficient in failing to
provide the President with any role in the process of constitutional
change, the evolving system of transformative appointment may easily
give a President too weighty a role. Presidents rarely come into office
with a mandate for fundamental change of the kind that Franklin
Delano Roosevelt plausibly claimed in the aftermath of the elections
of 1936. After all, Roosevelt had done far more during his first term
than simply prepare the way for reelection. He had gained congres-
sional support for an activist program that sharply broke with tradi-
tional constitutional principles, and had gained massive popular sup-
port despite the Old Court's eloquent constitutional critique of the
New Deal's interventionist premises. If the American people were
ever endorsing a break with their constitutional past, they were doing
so in the 1930'S.25
The transformative precedents established during Roosevelt's sec-
ond term, however, may be easily abused by future Presidents with
far more equivocal mandates for fundamental change. So long as they
can convince a bare majority of the Senate to consent to transfor-
mative appointments, constitutional law may be jolted onto a new
course without persuasive institutional evidence that a mobilized ma-
jority of the American people endorse the change. Once again, com-
pare the requirement that a bare majority of Senators consent to a
transformative appointment with the kinds of institutional assent de-
manded by the classical system of constitutional revision. Under ar-
ticle V, no amendment can even be proposed in the name of the
People by the Congress unless two-thirds of both Houses agree, not
just a bare majority of the Senate. Even such a weighty showing of
institutional support suffices only to put the proposal on the consti-
tutional agenda; a second institutionally weighty round of debate and
2S Surely the decisive majorities commanded by the New Deal Democrats in all sections of
the country would have been the envy of the Reconstruction Republicans and the Founding
Federalists, the two other political movements in our nation's history whose constitutional
achievements were of equal magnitude.
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decision is then necessary before the classical system allows a new
constitutional vision to be enacted into law. In short, the modern
practice seems too institutionally flimsy to give credible evidence of
the existence of the deep and broad popular support classically re-
quired for a sharp break with the constitutional past.
Yet the emerging system of transformative appointment not only
lacks institutional weight and legal focus remotely comparable to the
classical system; it also threatens to be unacceptably elitist. Think
again about article V's stipulation that our representatives in Wash-
ington may only propose amendments, and that a much more open-
ended debate is required in the several states before an amendment
can be ratified. While we may no longer believe that the states should
always have a veto over national political change, it is still possible
to design a national mechanism requiring our political elite in Wash-
ington to go to the People and make a special effort to gain general
public acceptance for their constitutional proposals. The device I have
in mind - the referendum - is already familiar in the constitutional
practice of our states, and in many foreign nations. Properly struc-
tured, it can serve as a catalyst for the broad-ranging popular debate
essential for the democratic legitimation of proposed constitutional
initiatives. Although President and Congress, acting together, should
be able to propose an amendment, they should not be able to gain
ratification without first going to the People and gaining the specially
focused and considered consent permitted by the use of the referendum
device.
Legal focus; institutional weight; popular responsiveness. Perhaps
these ideals can be made more concrete by proposing a constitutional
amendment that seems to capture them far better than does the cur-
rent practice of transformative appointment:
During his or her second term in office, a President may propose
constitutional amendments to the Congress of the United States; if
two-thirds of both Houses approve a proposal, it shall be listed on
the ballot at the next two succeeding presidential elections in each of
the several states; if three-fifths of the voters participating in each of
these elections should approve a proposed amendment, it shall be
ratified in the name of the People of the United States.
I have no stake in the details of this particular proposal. I present
it simply to fix ideas, allowing us to consider whether we should
replace the present practice of transformative appointment with a
presidentially-led mechanism closer to, but hardly identical with, the
assembly-led systems handed down to us by the Founders.
Even if such a proposal were adopted, three problems of imple-
mentation would remain. First, would such an amendment really
deter future Presidents from making transformative nominations?
While there can be no guarantees, I think that Presidents would be
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quite reluctant to provoke the principled opposition likely to arise
under the changed constitutional structure. The decision to forward
a Bork-like nomination to the Senate would immediately lead oppo-
nents to ask why the President did not make his transformative pro-
posal in the far more focused, institutionally weighty, and popularly
responsive context of the new amendment procedure, rather than
abuse the appointment process for purposes it serves relatively poorly.
It is easy for cynics to discount the political force of such "naive"
functional concerns. So long as the Republic remains in relatively
good health, however, American politicians will continue to take con-
stitutional questions seriously (if not as seriously as legalists may like).
Second, even if I am right about this, couldn't the President ac-
complish his transformative objectives secretly, without making nom-
inations that symbolized this intention in the manner of the Bork
nomination? After all, Presidents will still be called upon to fill va-
cancies on the Court. Thus, nothing prevents them from searching
through the list of "solid professionals" who are not cursed by the
paper record engendered by Borkian superqualification until they iden-
tify a person who wants to be a Justice so badly that he will solemnly
promise the President, in the privacy of the Oval Office, that he will
vote the Administration's way on a long list of issues. So long as this
secret commitment is successfully disguised from the public, it will be
difficult to defeat such nominations in the Senate. Thus, aren't we
engaged in an exercise in futility in calumniating against transforma-
tive appointments? Won't it still be possible for the President to get
his way with the Court, only now the Senate hearings will be reduced
to a sham?
My answer is yes, this is a danger: if Presidents are so hell-bent
on transformation and if they can find men and women who will keep
their side of the bargain after they have received life tenure, there is
not much that institutions can do to prevent such corrupt bargains.
And yet, as Publius cautiously put it, "[t]he supposition of universal
venality in human nature is little less an error in political reasoning
than the supposition of universal rectitude." 26 Moreover, I think most
of our Justices have done a fairly good job in recognizing that they
owe it to themselves, as well as the American people, to try to decide
cases on the basis of their conscientious interpretation of two centuries
of constitutional development, and not merely serve as well-paid ser-
vants of the President who put them in office. Is there any reason to
think that the future will be so much worse than the past?
Third, is it politically realistic to think that a proposal to amend
article V would ever survive the obsolescent obstacle course provided
by the unamended article V?
26 THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513-14 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. r961).
1988] 1183
HeinOnline -- 101 Harv. L. Rev.  1183 1987-1988
1184 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. iom:1i64
Before we give up the idea as hopeless, consider the alternative.
In the absence of an amendment to article V, history will not stand
still. There will be other presidentially-led efforts to make transfor-
mative appointments, with all the risks that such efforts entail. I
believe, moreover, that the American people will continue to tolerate
this technique because we recognize that the President ought to be
given an important role in constitutional lawmaking, and this is the
only mechanism we have hit upon so far to give him this role.
If, then, we wish to undermine the practice of transformative
appointment, it would be wise to take the possibility of an amendment
to article V seriously, and seek to build the kind of consensus necessary
to secure its ultimate adoption. In this way we may yet gain some-
thing of lasting value from the tragedy that Robert Bork has played
out before us in the Bicentennial year of our Republic.
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